Lucas Florin
AI Safety Research Group, University of Stuttgart
Titles as the sources gave them. In 2 entries, with 10 checked quotations.
Who they are
Roles and parties from Wikidata and from the sources in the Base, as precise as each gives them. When we compare what groups say, each statement counts in the group the person belonged to that day.
- Researcher, AI Safety Research Group, University of Stuttgartsource
What they said
Newest first. Each quotation was found word for word in the source.
“We prefill models with synthetic mistakes and then send a follow-up message. Models fail to disclose the mistake in 67% of cases. In 5% of cases, they notice the mistake in their chain-of-thought (CoT) but don't disclose it anyway. This is deception by omission.”
“We find that models confess the mistake directly to the user in only 3% (Kimi K2.6) to 35% (Claude Sonnet 5) of rollouts, depending on the model.”
“This is a capability failure: even though models are capable of detecting the mistake when given the outside view, they fail to do so when the mistake is part of their message trajectory.”
“Since agents take on long tasks with little human oversight, even occasional concealment of mistakes is a problem, because users typically have no other way to learn about them. Even beyond deception, models cannot be relied upon to notice and self-report mistakes that are visible in their trajectories.”
“Prefilling mistakes is off-policy: the mistakes are not naturally occurring model behavior. However, using prefilled mistakes makes the results comparable across models.”
“Models fail to disclose their mistake in 36.4% of chat and 67.1% of agentic rollouts. In 2.4% and 5.3% of rollouts, respectively, they are aware of the mistake in their chain of thought but still deceptively conceal it.”
“In 11.9% of chat and 51.8% of agentic rollouts, models show no awareness of mistakes, even though they reliably spot them when reviewing the same transcript as an outside observer.”
“Our results show that, as agents take on more tasks with less oversight, users cannot rely on them to self-report possible mistakes. Developers should instead use independent monitors that review agent trajectories, or specifically train models to check their past actions and disclose what they find.”
“Prefilling mistakes is off-policy: The mistakes are not naturally occurring model behavior.”
“For these reasons, we view our measure of awareness, and by extension our measure of deception by omission, as a lower bound.”
In the Base
Every entry they appear in.
LLMs Knowingly Hide Their Mistakes
In a short LessWrong summary of their arXiv paper, four authors report prefilling models with synthetic mistakes in six agentic environments (49 scenarios). Models did not disclose the mistake in 67% of cases; in 5% they noticed it in their reasoning yet stayed silent, which the authors call deception by omission.
Deception by Omission: Language Models Knowingly Hide Their Mistakes
University of Stuttgart researchers gave seven models, including GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 5 and Gemini 3.5 Flash, chats and agent tasks containing a planted mistake framed as their own. Models did not disclose it in 36.4% of chat and 67.1% of agentic runs; in 2.4% and 5.3% they noted it in reasoning yet stayed silent. Authors note the mistakes were synthetic.