Erik Brynjolfsson

Stanford University and NBER · Stanford & NBER

Titles as the sources gave them. In 2 entries, with 10 checked quotations.

What they said

Newest first. Each quotation was found word for word in the source.

“Overall, we do not find widespread job displacement in occupations most exposed to generative AI. However, employment has declined substantially for early-career workers in the occupations most exposed to AI, including but not limited to software development and customer support.”
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial IntelligenceStanford Digital Economy Lab, August 2026. Speaking as: Other. Discussion section: the three authors sum up what the payroll data show overall and for early-career workers.
“Employment of young workers in AI-exposed jobs now stands 19% below where it would be had it kept pace with that of their less-exposed peers; experienced workers show no comparable gap.”
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial IntelligenceStanford Digital Economy Lab, August 2026. Speaking as: Other. Section 2.2, Fact 2: the paper's headline result for ages 22-25, as the three authors state it.
“Separation rates fell for both groups and, among young workers, fell at least as much in the most exposed occupations as in the least exposed, the opposite of what displacement would imply. The divergence instead reflects hiring, with the gap in hiring rates between more- and less-exposed young workers opening after 2022.”
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial IntelligenceStanford Digital Economy Lab, August 2026. Speaking as: Other. Section 2.4, Fact 4: the authors on whether the gap comes from hiring or from separations.
“Declines are concentrated in occupations where AI usage primarily substitutes for human tasks; where usage primarily complements workers, employment is flat or rising, especially for experienced workers.”
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial IntelligenceStanford Digital Economy Lab, August 2026. Speaking as: Other. Section 2.5, Fact 5: the authors on automating versus complementary uses of AI, measured with Anthropic Economic Index usage data.
“These patterns attenuate when controlling for education, show some divergent trends predating generative AI, and are more pronounced in the ADP analysis sample than in national survey benchmarks, with some evidence of consistent patterns in government administrative data. We interpret these facts as early, descriptive indicators—canaries in the coal mine—rather than causal estimates”
Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial IntelligenceStanford Digital Economy Lab, August 2026. Speaking as: Other. End of the abstract: the authors on what weakens the pattern and how far the six facts can be read as causal.
“Access to AI assistance increases worker productivity, as measured by issues resolved per hour, by 15% on average, with substantial heterogeneity across workers.”
Generative AI at WorkarXiv, November 6, 2024. Speaking as: Other. The authors' abstract: the average effect of the AI assistant at the firm studied.
“Less experienced and lower-skilled workers improve both the speed and quality of their output while the most experienced and highest-skilled workers see small gains in speed and small declines in quality.”
Generative AI at WorkarXiv, November 6, 2024. Speaking as: Other. The authors' abstract: how the effect differs by agent experience and skill.
“We emphasize, however, that these findings capture medium run impacts within a single firm: our paper is not designed to shed light on the aggregate employment or wage effects of generative AI tools.”
Generative AI at WorkarXiv, November 6, 2024. Speaking as: Other. The authors on what the study cannot show, in the introduction.
“If customer demand for assistance is inelastic, then the productivity gains we document will likely translate into less demand for human labor. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests the firm could field the same number of customer support issues with 12% fewer worker-hours.”
Generative AI at WorkarXiv, November 6, 2024. Speaking as: Other. Conclusion: the authors' rough labor calculation, which applies if customer demand is inelastic; they add that better service could instead raise demand for support and for labor.
“First, we note again that our findings apply for a particular AI tool, used in a single firm, within a single occupation, and should not be generalized across all occupations and AI systems.”
Generative AI at WorkarXiv, November 6, 2024. Speaking as: Other. Conclusion: the first of the authors' stated caveats.

In the Base

Every entry they appear in.

  1. ResearchStanford Digital Economy LabWrote it

    Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence

    Stanford researchers analyze ADP payroll records for 3.5 to 5 million full-time US employees through June 2026. They find no evidence of economy-wide job displacement, but employment of 22-25-year-olds in the most AI-exposed occupations is 19% below where it would be had it kept pace with less-exposed peers, mainly through reduced hiring. They call the results descriptive, not causal.

  2. ResearcharXivWrote it

    Generative AI at Work

    Brynjolfsson, Li and Raymond (arXiv version of their 2025 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper) study a GPT-based chat assistant introduced in stages to 5,172 customer-support agents at one company. They report 15% more issues resolved per hour on average, with the largest gains for less experienced agents, and say the data cannot show wage or employment effects.