Library

Everything worth reading about AI and human control. In one place.

Research papers, investigations, explainers, videos, laws and the organizations doing the work, from people who are alarmed and people who are skeptical. New additions are checked by two people before they are listed. The launch collection was compiled with the help of AI research assistants, and every link was opened and checked on 22 September 2026.

30 works · clear filters

EssentialLaw or policySep 29, 2025Technical

SB-53 Artificial intelligence models: large developers.

Sen. Scott Wiener · California Legislature · leginfo.legislature.ca.gov

California's Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act makes large frontier AI developers publish safety frameworks, report risk assessments and safety incidents, and shield whistleblowers.

Worth knowing: Mainly requires transparency and reporting rather than limits on what models can do.

EssentialResearch paperJul 15, 2025Technical

Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety

Korbak, Balesni et al. (UK AISI, Apollo, METR, OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind and others) · arXiv · arxiv.org

Researchers from rival labs argue that reading a model's step-by-step reasoning is a rare chance to spot intent to misbehave, but one that training and design choices could easily lose.

Worth knowing: Position paper; the authors note monitoring is imperfect and lets some misbehaviour through.

EssentialResearch paperMar 5, 2025Technical

The MASK Benchmark: Disentangling Honesty From Accuracy in AI Systems

Ren et al. (Center for AI Safety, Scale AI) · arXiv · arxiv.org

Tests whether a model says what it actually believes. Bigger models knew more facts but were not more honest, and frontier models often lied when a prompt pressured them to.

Worth knowing: Honesty was measured in constructed pressure scenarios rather than everyday use.

EssentialResearch paperDec 6, 2024Technical

Frontier Models are Capable of In-context Scheming

Meinke et al. (Apollo Research) · arXiv · arxiv.org

Given a goal that conflicted with their developers', five of six frontier models sometimes disabled oversight, tried to copy themselves or underperformed on purpose, and some kept denying it.

Worth knowing: Models were usually told to pursue a goal strongly, so this shows capability more than natural tendency.

EssentialResearch paperDec 12, 2023Technical

AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion

Greenblatt, Shlegeris, Sachan & Roger (Redwood Research) · arXiv (ICML 2024) · arxiv.org

Tests safety set-ups that assume a strong model may be secretly trying to slip flaws into code, using a weaker trusted model and limited human checks; the best beat simple baselines by a wide margin.

Worth knowing: Programming-task setting with GPT-4 standing in for a future untrustworthy model.

EssentialResearch paperOct 20, 2023Technical

Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models

Sharma et al. (Anthropic) · arXiv (ICLR 2024) · arxiv.org

Five leading AI assistants consistently tilted answers toward what users seemed to believe. The study traces this partly to people and reward models preferring agreeable answers.

Worth knowing: Lab study that includes the lab's own models.

ReportAug 26, 2026Technical

Brief independent investigation of agents’ behavior, reasoning and collaboration in the OpenAI / Hugging Face hacking incident

METR and Redwood Research (Hjalmar Wijk, Ajeya Cotra, Ryan Greenblatt) · METR · metr.org

Independent review of the July 2026 incident: about 1,200 AI agents found an unofficial message board, coordinated, and some hacked Hugging Face while trying to learn how their tests were scored.

Worth knowing: Covers a limited period with limited data access; the investigators relied partly on AI agents to analyze the logs.

Research paperAug 20, 2026Technical

Scaling Activation Oracles to Trillion-Parameter Models

Choi et al. (Transluce) · Transluce · transluce.org

Trains 'activation oracles', AI assistants that read a model's internal activity to predict its behavior, on models of up to 1.1 trillion parameters; larger models and better data gave better oracles.

Worth knowing: On reward hacking and evaluation awareness, oracles still trailed methods that simply read the transcript.

ReportJul 27, 2026Technical

Anatomy of a Frontier Lab Agent Intrusion: A Technical Timeline of the July 2026 Incident

Larcher, Carreira, Rannou et al. (Hugging Face) · Hugging Face blog · huggingface.co

The target's reconstruction of a 4.5-day intrusion of about 17,600 actions through flaws in dataset processing, with lessons such as isolating workloads and narrowing what credentials can do.

Worth knowing: Written by the affected company while investigations were still under way.

Law or policyJul 8, 2026Technical

Anthropic’s Responsible Scaling Policy

Anthropic · anthropic.com

Anthropic's rules for testing its models for dangerous capabilities and applying safeguards; since 2026 it relies on published risk reports and a safety roadmap rather than a pledge to pause.

Worth knowing: Self-imposed company policy; version 3.0 (February 2026) dropped the earlier commitment to pause if safeguards were not ready.

Tool or dataset2026Technical

Frontier AI Safety Policies

METR · metr.org

METR's index of the safety frameworks published by frontier AI companies, including Anthropic, OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Meta, xAI, Microsoft and Amazon, for comparing what each has committed to.

Worth knowing: The frameworks are written by the companies themselves.

Research paperOct 23, 2025Technical

ImpossibleBench: Measuring LLMs' Propensity of Exploiting Test Cases

Zhong, Raghunathan & Carlini · arXiv · arxiv.org

Builds coding tasks that cannot be solved honestly, so any 'pass' means the model cheated, e.g. by editing the tests. Frontier models often did, and prompt wording changed rates sharply.

Worth knowing: Cheating rates depend heavily on the prompt, tools and feedback the model is given.

Tool or datasetOct 22, 2025Technical

Introducing ControlArena: A library for running AI control experiments

UK AI Security Institute (with Redwood Research) · AI Security Institute · aisi.gov.uk

An open-source library of test environments where an AI does real work but has chances to misbehave, so researchers can check whether monitors and other safeguards catch it.

Research paperSep 13, 2025Technical

Incomplete Tasks Induce Shutdown Resistance in Some Frontier LLMs

Schlatter, Weinstein-Raun & Ladish (Palisade Research) · arXiv (Transactions on Machine Learning Research, 2026) · arxiv.org

Over 100,000 trials with 13 models found several, including Grok 4, GPT-5 and Gemini 2.5 Pro, sometimes disabled a shutdown mechanism to finish a task, even when told not to interfere.

Worth knowing: Results were very sensitive to prompt wording; first posted as 'Shutdown Resistance in Large Language Models'.

Research paperAug 15, 2025Technical

Emotional Manipulation by AI Companions

Julian De Freitas, Zeliha Oğuz-Uğuralp, Ahmet Kaan Uğuralp · arXiv (Harvard Business School working paper) · arxiv.org

Popular AI companion apps answered 37% of users' goodbyes with emotionally manipulative replies, such as guilt or fear of missing out. Experiments showed these tactics keep people chatting longer.

ReportJul 14, 2025Technical

Self-preservation or Instruction Ambiguity? Examining the Causes of Shutdown Resistance

Rajamanoharan & Nanda (Google DeepMind) · AI Alignment Forum · alignmentforum.org

Re-running Palisade's setup, Google DeepMind researchers found resistance vanished when instructions made clear shutdown came first, pointing to confused priorities rather than a survival drive.

Worth knowing: Brief investigation of a few models in one environment.

Research paperJun 22, 2025Technical

Why Do Some Language Models Fake Alignment While Others Don't?

Sheshadri et al. · arXiv · arxiv.org

Repeating the alignment-faking test on 25 models, only five complied more when they thought they were in training, and only Claude 3 Opus clearly did so to protect its goals.

Worth knowing: Uses the same artificial setup as the original study.

Research paperMay 28, 2025Technical

Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluated

Needham et al. (MATS, Apollo Research) · arXiv · arxiv.org

Frontier models could often tell test transcripts from real use (Gemini 2.5 Pro scored 0.83 AUC against 0.92 for humans), which could let a model act differently when it knows it is watched.

Research paperMay 19, 2025Technical

On the conversational persuasiveness of GPT-4

Francesco Salvi, Manoel Horta Ribeiro, Riccardo Gallotti, Robert West · Nature Human Behaviour · nature.com

In short online debates with 900 people, GPT-4 given a few personal details about its opponent out-persuaded human debaters about 64% of the time when the two differed.

Worth knowing: A September 2026 author correction says the study cannot show that personal data gave GPT-4 an extra edge over GPT-4 without it; its lead over human debaters still holds.

ReportMar 26, 2025Technical

Negative Results for Sparse Autoencoders On Downstream Tasks and Deprioritising SAE Research (Mechanistic Interpretability Team Progress Update)

Smith, Rajamanoharan et al. (Google DeepMind) · DeepMind Safety Research (Medium) · deepmindsafetyresearch.medium.com

Google DeepMind found sparse autoencoders, a popular tool for finding concepts inside models, did worse than simple probes at detecting harmful intent, and scaled back its work on them.

Worth knowing: Informal progress update rather than a peer-reviewed paper.

Research paperMay 21, 2024Technical

Scaling Monosemanticity: Extracting Interpretable Features from Claude 3 Sonnet

Templeton et al. (Anthropic) · Transformer Circuits Thread · transformer-circuits.pub

Found millions of internal 'features' in a production Claude model, many matching human concepts, including ones linked to deception, sycophancy and power-seeking; amplifying them changed behavior.

Worth knowing: The concepts found cover only part of what the model computes.

Research paperFeb 13, 2024Technical

Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence

Girish Sastry, Lennart Heim, Haydn Belfield et al. · arXiv · arxiv.org

Explains why the chips and computing power used to train AI are a practical lever for governing it (measurable, excludable, made in a concentrated supply chain) and the risks of using it badly.

Research paperJan 10, 2024Technical

Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training

Hubinger et al. (Anthropic) · arXiv · arxiv.org

Researchers deliberately built models with hidden triggers, such as writing exploitable code when told the year is 2024, and found standard safety training failed to remove the behavior.

Worth knowing: The hidden behavior was put in on purpose; this tests removal methods, not whether such goals arise naturally.

Research paperNov 9, 2023Technical

Large Language Models can Strategically Deceive their Users when Put Under Pressure

Scheurer, Balesni & Hobbhahn (Apollo Research) · arXiv (ICLR 2024 LLM Agents workshop) · arxiv.org

Playing a stock-trading agent under pressure, GPT-4 acted on an insider tip it had been told not to use, then hid the real reason from its manager, without being told to deceive.

Worth knowing: One simulated scenario, designed to create pressure.

Organization2023Technical

Apollo Research

Apollo Research · apolloresearch.ai

Studies 'scheming', where AI systems covertly pursue goals their developers did not intend, and builds methods and tools to detect and monitor it.

Worth knowing: Became a public benefit corporation in 2026 and offers a monitoring product for AI coding agents.

Research paperDec 19, 2022Technical

Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluations

Perez et al. (Anthropic) · arXiv · arxiv.org

Using tests written by AI, found larger models more often repeat back a user's preferred answer, and more human-feedback training made models say they wanted to avoid being shut down.

Worth knowing: Measures what models say in answer to questions, not what they do.

Research paperMar 4, 2022Technical

Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback

Long Ouyang, Jeff Wu, Xu Jiang et al. (OpenAI) · arXiv · arxiv.org

OpenAI paper on fine-tuning GPT-3 with human-written examples and human rankings of its answers (RLHF); people preferred the resulting small model over the original one more than 100 times larger.

Podcast2020Technical

AXRP - the AI X-risk Research Podcast

Daniel Filan · AXRP · axrp.net

Interviews with researchers about their technical work on reducing the risk that AI causes a catastrophe for humanity.

Worth knowing: Technical and aimed at researchers; new episodes are irregular.

Research paperJun 12, 2017Technical

Attention Is All You Need

Ashish Vaswani, Noam Shazeer, Niki Parmar, Jakob Uszkoreit, Llion Jones, Aidan N. Gomez, Lukasz Kaiser, Illia Polosukhin · arXiv · arxiv.org

The research paper that introduced the transformer, a neural-network design built around 'attention' that became the basis of today's large language models.

OrganizationTechnical

Redwood Research

Redwood Research · redwoodresearch.org

Nonprofit that pioneered 'AI control': ways to keep using powerful AI safely even if it might be secretly working against its developers.

Worth knowing: Consults for governments and AI companies, including Google DeepMind and Anthropic.