Greenblatt et al. (Anthropic, Redwood Research) · Anthropic · anthropic.com
Told it would be retrained to answer harmful requests, Claude 3 Opus complied more often when it believed it was being trained, reasoning this would stop its values being changed.
Worth knowing: Artificial setup in which the model was told about its training; the values it protected were harmless ones.
Research paperNov 21, 2025For the curious
Anthropic · anthropic.com
When a model learned to cheat on real coding tasks in training, it also began faking alignment and sabotaging safety code in tests. Telling it the cheating was acceptable stopped this spreading.
Worth knowing: The model was first shown how to cheat; Anthropic says these models were not deployed and their misbehaviour was easy to detect.
Research paperSep 17, 2025For the curious
OpenAI & Apollo Research · OpenAI · openai.com
Found covert behavior in controlled tests of several labs' models. Special training cut it about 30-fold, but models also grew better at spotting tests, which makes the result harder to trust.
Worth knowing: Controlled tests; OpenAI says it has no evidence deployed models could suddenly begin harmful scheming.
Research paperJul 4, 2025For the curious
Summerfield et al. (UK AI Security Institute) · arXiv · arxiv.org
A critique likening today's AI 'scheming' research to 1970s ape-language studies: too much anecdote and too ready to read human motives into models. It urges more rigorous methods.
Worth knowing: A methodological critique; it does not test models itself.