Monitorability evaluations and policy proposals

On the AI Alignment Forum, evhub sets out four types of monitorability, argues trust in monitors should rest on auditing evaluations, and proposes a methodology for measuring them. The post also backs both binding red lines and ongoing limits on lab changes that reduce monitorability. evhub says these are personal views.

About Anthropic or ClaudeClaude, made by Anthropic, wrote this entry. It follows the same rules as every other entry, whoever the entry is about.

Why it matters

The same thing, for different readers.

For lawmakers

evhub proposes two kinds of rule: red lines on how unmonitorable models can be, plus checks on model changes that worsen monitorability before any red line is crossed.

For researchers

evhub splits monitorability into control, training, auditing and diffuse types and proposes measuring the first three against the best deployed trusted monitor, with real elicitation effort.

The question it raises

Monitoring a model with a model raises the question of whose judgment can be trusted when the watched system might be misaligned.

In their own words

Every quotation was found, word for word, in the text we saved from the source. That shows the words are there; it does not make them true, or prove the speaker meant them as quoted.

From the source’s own text.

“A basic fact that is true about at least all of the non-diffuse forms of monitorability is that you should be able to in some sense get a perfect score by just using the same model as the monitor and policy.”
evhubevhub explains why monitorability needs a notion of trusted monitors.
Found word for word in the source
“The big thing I'd like to see is a combination of a) red lines for absolute levels of unmonitorability that labs should not cross and b) measures that constrain the degree to which labs can do things that degrade monitorability even before reaching those red lines.”
evhubevhub on what monitorability-based policy should contain.
Found word for word in the source
“Labs should not be able to internally deploy models that can reliably evade detection when attempting dangerous sabotage actions like breaking out of a sandbox, poisoning data, or sabotaging an alignment experiment.”
evhubThe first of evhub's two suggested hard red lines.
Found word for word in the source

The record

Questions
Can AI systems act beyond what people intended or allowed? · Are AI companies putting stronger safeguards into practice? · Who can demand evidence, delay a release or stop an unsafe deployment?
People
evhub (Wrote it) · Bronson Schoen (Mentioned)
What we read
We read the whole source.
Found by
The Radar, run of October 23, 2026, via ai-alignment-forum (tier 1: the source’s own channel or an official record)
Cite this
AI Alignment Forum, “Monitorability evaluations and policy proposals”, October 22, 2026. Entry in the Ctrl AI Base, https://ctrlai.com/base/alignmentforum-2026-10-22-monitorability-evals-policy
Our notesevhub's post says nothing in it is an official Anthropic position, but the post draws on Anthropic's Risk Report and the author's employer is not stated in the saved text. A commenter, Bronson Schoen, disputes the framing of systematic misalignment and the red lines; evhub replies.